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Preface 
It is our pleasure to present Global Cooperation Research Paper No. 24 
titled ‘From the Global to the Everyday: Anti-Globalization Metaphors 
in Trump’s and Salvini’s Political Language’ by three of the GCR21’s re-
search group leaders Katja Freistein, Frank Gadinger and Christine Un-
rau. While globalization is often addressed as a fragmented and thus high-
ly complex economic, social and political process, right-wing populists are 
rather successful in pinpointing what the problems of globalization are 
for ‘the people.’ But how do they manage to translate global complexities 
into an easy-to-understand critique of globalization, which seemingly is 
so convincing as it arguably generates broad approval? To approach this 
problematique the authors ask ‘how’ the populists deliver their message 
to make anti-globalization appealing and point us to the right-wing popu-
list’s use of metaphors such as ‘the house’ and ‘the wall.’ The Research 
Paper argues that it is by way of emotional narratives that right-wing 
populists attempt to further the rejection of globalism among their fol-
lowers. By drawing on recent theoretical and methodological innovation 
in the social sciences, and especially the so-called performative turn, the 
authors establish a new focus in the study of populism. They turn to the 
everyday narrative workings of right-wing populist politics. 
Philip Liste (former member of the Editorial Board)
3From the Global to the Everyday: Anti-Globaliza-
tion Metaphors in Trump’s and Salvini’s Political 
Language1 
1 Introduction
We have all become familiar with populist modes of political storytelling. As 
populist parties and movements gain more attention, we have witnessed their 
growing success in different liberal democracies in ‘the West’.2 An interest-
ing parallel exists between European countries and the US regarding how 
populist right-wing movements in particular mobilize support, even though 
the US’ Republican Party, to which Donald Trump belongs, would not gener-
ally be considered right-wing. One of the larger issues that apparently unites 
different groups within the public is the opposition to what has been called 
‘globalization’, across various processes and outcomes. The ideas of global 
capitalism, global governance or international law, as we know them, refer 
to remote and often highly complex phenomena that seem to have little rel-
evance to the everyday life of people. Yet, rhetorical tropes like ‘globalists’, 
mockery of climate ‘hysteria’, or ‘asylum industry’ have become well-known 
figures in right-wing populist speeches that seem to resonate with their con-
stituency (Wodak 2019: 196). In this paper, we seek to explore how – by what 
narrative means and particularly with what kind of metaphors – right-wing 
populist movements have made anti-global sentiments appealing. The appeal, 
we would argue, refers to the overall success of right-wing populists, which 
remains puzzling to ordinary citizens as well as to political scientists. Since 
we are concerned with the performative nature of narratives, the observations 
we make are restricted to utterances and their potential to evoke certain kinds 
of responses, for instance affective reactions. Our aim is thus to account for 
a small piece of a puzzle, namely how anti-globalization motives in populist 
narratives have contributed to bringing them closer to a public not particu-
larly interested in globalization as such. Therefore, we will study narratives 
of right-wing populists in Europe and the US to trace how they translate glo-
balization critique from the global to the everyday, and how they reduce the 
widely acknowledged complexity of globalization to rather simple, at times 
formulaic, anti-globalization tropes. In particular, we demonstrate these nar-
1 Earlier versions of this research paper were presented at the research colloqium of the 
Centre for Global Cooperation Research (May 2019) and at the first GCR21 annual 
conference (April 2019). We thank all participants for their helpful comments. We are 
especially grateful to Angela Benkhadda, Victoria Derrien, Philip Liste, Tobias Schäfer, 
Christopher Smith Ochoa, Eva Marie Trösser, Sigrid Quack and Taylan Yildiz for close 
readings, very helpful comments and support in editing.
2 ‘Success’, in our understanding, refers to both recent election results (including the elec-
tions to the European Parliament in May 2019) and general polls (e.g. Eurobarometer).  
4rative operations by using two recent cases of ‘successful’ right-wing populist, 
anti-globalization storytelling, which build on strong metaphors. One is the 
metaphor of the ‘House’, used by former Italian Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of the Interior Matteo Salvini, and the other is U.S. President Donald 
Trump’s metaphor of ‘The Wall’. The ‘Wall’ and the ‘House’ have been used 
by other politicians in Europe and the US as well. We chose here to focus 
on Salvini and Trump because both politicians used them effectively both 
before and after their electoral victories. Both cases give a good impression 
of how metaphors can be used in populist storytelling to closely interlink ex-
istential crises of the people with the more abstract dangers of globalization. 
Even more, metaphors, we argue, serve to make different negative aspects of 
globalization more tangible than they would be in a factual mode of politi-
cal communication, particularly by portraying globalization as a threat, let 
us say, through mass migration or the massive influx of foreign goods. By 
the same move, a metaphor can create an inside/outside distinction (similarly 
Campbell 1998) that externalizes threats that are possibly internal to a polity 
but can be blamed on the abstract idea of globalization through the use of 
metaphors. Messages of cultural racism, which warn for instance against an 
‘exchange of population’, can be thereby camouflaged. What is more, meta-
phors can be utilized to construct a crisis, which in turn makes it possible for 
populists to adopt the saviour-role of an energetic hero, who alone is able to 
resolve the supposed crisis. 
Our paper contributes to recent debates on practices, narratives, and dis-
courses in populism studies around the so-called performative turn (e.g. 
Wodak 2015, 2019; Moffitt 2016; Moffitt and Tormey 2014; Brubaker 2017; 
Freistein and Gadinger 2019; Jansen 2016). Moreover, our methodological 
framework, which foregrounds the still underexplored role of metaphors in 
political language, touches upon major research concerns of IR and political 
sciences around storytelling, images, cultural identity, and the deeper reasons 
behind the distrust in the liberal international order. We develop our argu-
ment as follows: First, we elaborate on our methodological framework, which 
is built around the concepts of narratives, metaphors, and emotions, and ex-
plain its analytical potential in studying populist storytelling. We suggest the 
usage of guiding metaphors as analytical entry points to reconstruct the un-
derlying messages of populist narratives. Second, we demonstrate through 
two exemplary cases of metaphors-in-use how populist actors operate with 
imagery and emotions to convey political messages. Third, we reflect on our 
results of narrative analysis and suggest a broader empirical scope of the 
emerging interdisciplinary research program.
52 The Performative Turn in Populism Studies:  
Developing a Conceptual Framework
Our interest in the localization or normalization strategies of anti-global sen-
timents by a selected number of right-wing groups results from both a general 
interest in political narratives as well as an interest in the emotive (or affec-
tive) dimension of political storytelling as it has been recently discussed in 
IR and political science (e.g. Oppermann and Spencer 2018; Gadinger et al. 
2019; Galai 2017; Miskimmon et al. 2013; Ravecca and Dauphinee 2018). 
While the description of right-wing movements has often been reduced to 
nationalism, we focus more specifically on the use of anti-global tropes, how 
they are narrated, and how this complex relationship is made emotionally 
appealing to gain political influence. As we would argue, this appeal can be 
traced to the close interlinkages of anti-global narratives with people’s every-
day life. The ‘everyday’, seen from a narratological perspective (Groth 2019), 
unites the political sphere with the sphere of personal human experience – 
and thus manages to bridge the divide between abstract problems, such as 
globalization, and the lifeworld of individuals. As narratologists remind us, 
this bridging of complex events into a single meaningful story with a temporal 
sequencing of beginning, middle and end works through emplotment (Somers 
1994: 616). To put it simply, narratives are the key device for making sense of 
social action and for organizing our experiences in everyday life (Czarniaw-
ska 2004: 11; Bruner 1991: 4). This broad claim of narration as a pervasive 
human practice of making sense of reality (Fisher 1987) becomes possible 
through various narrative means such as metaphors, roles, and plots (see Bal 
2009), which we will explore in the following, as instances of performativity 
in the study of populism. 
Populism is not a completely new phenomenon. For at least two decades, 
populism studies scholars (e.g. Canovan 1999; Taggart 2000; Mudde 2004) 
have pointed to the normalization of populist strategies and techniques within 
the everyday governing practices of Western democracies. These scholars ar-
gued that populism should not be misleadingly understood as a pathological 
mode of politics, but rather as a political style and expression of new forms 
of political communication and representation, which can also be observed 
in the development of established mainstream parties. Populism ‘accompa-
nies democracy like a shadow’, as Margaret Canovan (1999: 16) famously 
remarked. Therefore, the research challenge for scholars (and beyond) is to 
trace the ambivalent character and consequences of populist governing prac-
tices in democratic societies. Against the background of recent developments 
such as the election of Donald Trump, Brexit, widespread fear among the 
public and scholars about the end of the (liberal) international order and 
eroding practices of global cooperation, the relevance of populism for politi-
cal science and IR scholars has increased significantly. Populism was formerly 
6a specific issue of comparative politics and parties research, which sought to 
identify its ideological core. This has now shifted towards an interdisciplinary 
exchange, including also IR scholars, that aims to understand the global rise 
of populism (e.g. Wilson 2017; Muis and Immerzeel 2017; Hozic and True 
2017;  Šimunjak and Caliandro 2019; Magcamit 2017; Mudde and Kalt-
wasser 2012; Judis 2016).3 The recent performative turn in populism studies 
is more interested in the various practices, styles, performances, narratives, 
and discourses of populism (e.g. Moffitt 2016; Wodak 2015; de Cleen et al. 
2019). These scholars accept the ambivalent features of populism, which does 
not follow a universally adoptable strategy, but rather seems to be flexible in 
different cultural contexts. However, it remains puzzling how populist actors 
are able to develop a broad variety of political narratives around such ‘a thin-
centred ideology’ (Mudde 2004: 544) that ‘considers society to be ultimately 
separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups’ of ‘“the pure peo-
ple“ versus the “corrupt elite“, and which argues that politics should be an 
expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’ (Ibid: 543; 
similarly Müller 2016: 42). Not surprisingly, populist movements make use 
of creative storytelling to renew and reproduce the core message of this con-
structed antagonism to mobilize their supporters and reach a wider audience. 
Common populist narratives centre on founding myths of the true body of 
the people, conspiracies of a corrupt establishment (the press, the ruling class 
etc.) against the people, the romanticization of a glorious past, the superiority 
of everyday knowledge against academia and intellectuals, the glorification 
of patriarchy, and, as has been observed by others (e.g. Heitmeyer 2018) a 
strong rhetorical stance on the repercussions of a globalized world. 
Of course, opposition to ‘globalization’ is by no means unique to right-wing 
populists. We are familiar with the critique of globalization which was ar-
ticulated by movement organizations like Attac or at gatherings such as the 
World Social Forum, which was founded as a counter summit to the Da-
vos World Economic Forum (cf. De Sousa Santos 2006). Many protagonists 
of this heterogeneous social movement, which flourished around the turn of 
the millennium, developed alternative visions of a ‘globalization from below’ 
(Falk 1997), ‘global justice’ (Della Porta 2007) or ‘alter-globalization’ (Pleyers 
2010). By contrast, both right-wing and left-wing populists are currently urg-
ing to retrieve ‘sovereignty’ and ‘national identity’ (cf. Crouch 2019). While 
3 The focus of these recent debates is mainly on the question of whether and how populism 
is a threat or corrective for liberal democracy. One result is, from our point of view, that 
populism is not per se anti-democratic, but rather anti-liberal. Whereas the camp that 
interprets populism as a threat for democracy put emphasis on the anti-pluralist stance 
(e.g. Müller 2016: 44), another camp, which underlines its corrective function, argues 
that (leftist) populism can mobilize criticism against pathologies of liberalism such as 
rising socioeconomic inequality under capitalism (e.g. Mouffe 2018). Although there are 
many attempts to differentiate between ‘good’ left-wing populism and ‘bad’ right-wing 
populism, the normative criterion of differentiation remains often vague. Following Ruth 
Wodak (2015: 2) a major difference lies in the nativist concept of the nation, combined 
with chauvinistic and racist notions of ‘the people’. 
7there is some overlap in the nationalism of right-wing and left-wing populists, 
they differ with regard to the mode and target of exclusion. While in left-wing 
populism (e.g. Podemos or Syriza) the emphasis on national sovereignty is 
only symbolically exclusive in so far as it excludes certain elites from the na-
tion, radical right populism is characterized by the urge to exclude anyone 
who is regarded as ‘foreign’ not only on the symbolical, but also on the mate-
rial and political level (cf. De Cleen 2017). 4 
Populism studies scholars have invested much intellectual energy to define 
the ideological core of populism. Although minimalist definitions, such as 
Cas Mudde’s above-mentioned suggestion of two homogenous, antagonistic 
blocks between ‘the people’ and ‘the elites’, exist, and provide at least some 
general guidance for conceptualizing populism, any attempt to define pop-
ulism in terms of ideology fails. As Canovan (1999: 4) argues, this is because 
the anti-elitist mobilization may be reacting to a different ideological environ-
ment. Populism is therefore ‘not just a reaction against power structures but 
an appeal to a recognized authority’. As Canovan (1999: 4) further argues, 
‘populists claim legitimacy on the grounds that they speak for the people: 
that is to say, they claim to represent the democratic sovereign, not a sectional 
interest such as an economic class’. There is a consensus among populism 
studies scholars that populism is a ‘thin-centred ideology’, which is, however, 
able to connect in a parasitic relationship with more comprehensible and his-
torically powerful ideologies across the whole political spectrum. The reason 
for populism’s adaptability in line with progressives, reactionaries, democrats, 
and autocrats, from the left and the right, lies in its ‘empty heart’ and its lack 
of a commitment to key values, as Paul Taggart (2000: 4) famously argued. 
Thus, ‘populism has an essentially chameleonic quality that means it always 
takes on the hue of the environment in which it occurs’ (Taggart 2000: 4). 
Besides this notion of populism as ideology, other understandings have also 
gained traction in the research agenda of populism studies. In particular, 
notions of political mobilization, and distinct forms of a political style per-
formed and enacted in changing governing practices and discourses are high-
lighted. Whereas populism as a mobilization strategy is mainly understood 
as a normatively desirable rationale of leftist movements (e.g. Mouffe 2018), 
the latter strand of research is in the midst of developing a promising inter-
disciplinary programme across communication studies, cultural studies, po-
litical science, sociology, discourse and gender studies. Scholars here are less 
interested in identifying a generic sense of populism and instead trace the 
‘chameleonic quality’ of populism by understanding it as a rather flexible 
4 Rhetorical and narrative rejection of globalization is not necessarily reflected in strictly 
isolationist policies. On the contrary, we often find protagonists of the populist radical 
right who actively pursue financial or economic policies which contradict their motto of 
‘my country first’. Some politicians, including Donald Trump, have personally profited 
from a liberalized global economy.  These and other contradictions are made less salient 
by narrative strategies. 
8discursive and stylistic repertoire (Brubaker 2017: 360; see also Jansen 2016). 
Their research explores how populist actors and movements perform populist 
strategies, techniques and practices across different cultural settings and how 
they operate by drawing upon storytelling devices such as narratives, meta-
phors and imagery to shape discourses with political authority. The puzzling 
question is how populists work in everyday governing practices and how they 
manage to develop appealing populist stories, which reach and mobilize sup-
port in the public. This research agenda has stimulated completely different 
accounts, which use different theoretical backgrounds and concepts, but are 
mostly rooted in the tradition of interpretive research methodology. 
Although these scholars put emphasis on different concepts, they share the 
core premise, underpinned by the linguistic turn in social sciences, that lan-
guage does not work as a neutral instrument, but rather as a medium of con-
struction of social reality with all its performative effects on power relations. 
While political scientists often focus on the strategic use of arguments and 
their content in the normative tradition of discourse ethics, the linguistic in-
sight that narration is a basic human practice has gone largely ignored. Most 
importantly, narration always operates between fact and fiction and produces 
sense and confusion. This makes it an unreliable medium of communication 
(Koschorke 2018: 12). Populists, however, are well aware of this creative 
space of storytelling through rhetorical devices such as excuses, calculated 
breaches of taboos, and the narrative play with images and numbers (Wodak 
2018). Of course, politicians from mainstream parties are also storytellers 
and use populist strategies such as glamorous performances (e.g. French Pres-
ident Emanuel Macron in Versailles or in a French military uniform on an 
aircraft carrier) or the emphasis on emotions over programmes (e.g. New 
Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern appearing first pregnant, then with 
her baby in public, while holding office – thus performing the compatibility 
of motherhood and professional life, which was both criticized and lauded). 
The difference is a matter of degree, as most mainstream politicians are still 
interested in a conversation about arguments, in contrast to most right-wing 
populists who aim at destroying the belief in democratic institutions (Levitsky 
and Ziblatt 2018). Their mode of communication explicitly resists the logic of 
rational argumentation and works with subtle messages in normative ambiv-
alence. As Wodak (2015: 29) has argued, right-wing movements do not use a 
consistent narrative or coherent ideology. Instead, they use a broad repertoire 
of slogans and statements, which are often contradicting, but nevertheless 
form narratives that might be appealing for the audience. This ‘ontological 
indifference’ of narratives reminds us that other criteria of judging a story 
exist besides evidence-based truth claims (Koschorke 2018: 17). As Hendrik 
Wagenaar (2011: 212) argued, ‘the audience will judge the story’s coherence, 
plausibility and acceptability. If it fails on any of these counts, it will suggest 
adjustments or suggest a different story altogether’. Thus, the mediation of 
narratives is contingent on social status and political orientation and the cur-
9rency of trust plays a crucial role in deciding whether the audience believes 
the narrator (Groth 2019: 5). We would argue that populist actors in particu-
lar understand this interplay between narrator and audience and interpret it 
as a permanent game of flexible adaption, as Wagenaar described it, which 
makes our methodological suggestion to consider narratives and emotions 
as significant concepts to explain populist communication on globalization 
promising.  
3 Doing Narrative Analysis: Guiding Metaphors 
As Analytical Entry-Points
We draw on an interdisciplinary set of approaches to narratology in order 
to describe what political stories – the object of our interest here – refer to. 
International Relations (hereafter IR) has recently explored narration more 
systematically, pointing to the importance of fiction (Devetak 2009), myths 
(Bliesemann de Guevara 2016), and in a more general sense ‘low data’ (Weld-
es 2006) in the analysis of politics. Political narratives can refer to both stra-
tegically developed official stories (Miskimmon et al. 2013) as well as to more 
everyday practices of reconstructing meaning in puzzling local events such as 
urban riots (Gadinger et al. 2019). In our understanding, narrative analysis 
can account for various types of political stories, but does not presuppose 
strategic control over content and form. Rather, cultural context, for instance 
in the provision of metaphors, images, or even characters, is vital for ‘success’, 
i.e. public resonance of (but not necessarily agreement with) a story. Political 
stories function as normalizing, legitimizing and/or scandalizing instruments 
that can create, silence, or perpetuate various interests and claims. Narration 
is therefore not a harmless exercise as it entails power relations, provides 
sources of (de-) legitimacy and produces binding energy for collective identity 
(Eder 2006).
Some of the core elements of narratives, taken from narratological approach-
es, are ‘plot’, ‘roles’ and ‘imagery’ or ‘metaphors’. Both ontological narratives, 
i.e. stories individuals tell in order to understand and communicate situations 
in their personal lives and political narratives feature sequentiality, causality 
and temporality, all of which are categories that refer to the way in which 
single elements of a story are ordered to form a plot (Polkinghorne 1988: 19; 
White 1987: 9). Making sense of events and experiences, speakers attribute 
a certain logic – e.g. as temporal or causal sequences – to their stories, which 
need not be derived from the actual order of events or the exact experience 
(Patterson and Monroe 1998: 316). Plots often follow a culturally shaped 
reservoir of possible choices, such as tragedy or comedy, reflecting familiar-
ity with shared ideas in a given context. However, these classic plot patterns, 
in the tradition of Hayden White (1973), also constitute a central element of 
10
political storytelling in international politics. The blurred boundaries between 
fact and fiction – central to narrative studies – point to the close interrelation 
between our knowledge of fictional stories such as fairy tales or fables and the 
stories we encounter in various other contexts, including politics. Taggart’s 
(2000: 96) case of ‘the heartland’ is a prime example for how populists work 
with myths to construct narratives around ideas of inward-looking (national) 
organic communities, which provide justifications ‘for the exclusion of the de-
monized’. Such metaphors, which often follow fantasmatic logics of creating 
vague imaginations of a better world in the glorious past outside the political 
sphere, are still significant in populist storytelling as the Brexit campaign un-
derlined (Freistein and Gadinger 2020).
This also influences how speakers conceive of their own roles and that of 
others. The formulaic attribution of roles such as tragic hero, comical side-
kick, or purely evil antagonist are not restricted to literary genres, but also 
reappear – in different guises – in stories about more remote spheres such as 
world politics, party competition, or climate negotiations. Think of state lead-
ers portraying themselves as cowboys (former U.S. President George W. Bush) 
entrepreneurs (like Trump or former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusco-
ni), strong men in wildlife (Russian president Vladimir Putin, often shirtless) 
or working-class guys (former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who 
stressed his explicitly proletarian preference for beer). Populist actors, in par-
ticular, take this role-playing to the extreme by combining extraordinariness 
with ordinariness to create a political persona that can be taken seriously, but 
is never too remote from ‘the people’. They make strong efforts to fulfil the 
role of extraordinary figures between strong leadership, heroic attributes and 
the interesting, ‘accessible’ and entertaining personas of celebrities (Moffitt 
2016: 55-57).  Here, it is important to note that the repertoire is not unlim-
ited. Successful political storytelling draws on these culturally conveyed pat-
terns of plots and roles in order to tap into recipients’ cultural knowledge or 
‘cultural repertoires’, as the different characterizations nicely illustrate (see 
Lamont and Thévenot 2000: 8).5
Finally, different from content analysis, an interest in narratives presuppos-
es an interest in the imagery, metaphors, symbolic representations, and even 
numbers that are part of storytelling (Stone 2002). In particular, metaphors 
and images provide shortcuts to much larger narratives, which can be traced 
and connected with other stories (in struggles, overlaps etc.), raising the fur-
ther issue of ‘polyphony’ not pursued here. It refers to the various kinds of 
5 This notion of culture as ‘repertoire for action’ goes back to a seminal article by Ann 
Swidler (1986). Against essential notions of culture (fixed values and dispositions), a 
practice-oriented approach puts emphasis on the constraining and enabling tool-kit struc-
ture and the interactive negotiation of ‘culture in action’. The often-mentioned question: 
under which conditions a political/populist story reaches a wider audience and success-
fully connects to cultural repertoires, cannot be answered per se, but needs to be studied 
in every single empirical case ‘in action’, see Jansen (2016). 
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interactions between potentially competing political narratives that strive for 
dominance over each other. Coming back to imagery, we are particularly in-
terested here in the use of metaphors, films, images and the like because they 
do not only function as analytical entry points for us, but also may be vital 
in offering affective triggers. Narratives and emotions are deeply intertwined 
(Mayer 2014: 138). Narratives can trigger emotions and emotions contribute 
to the powerful effects of storytelling. For our analysis we draw on the in-
sights from interdisciplinary research on emotions, with a focus on the debate 
concerning the relationship between politics and emotions in general and the 
emotional or affective turn in IR.
One possibility to systematize the vast and growing literature on the nature 
of emotions is to distinguish between those approaches which – building on 
William James’ famous essay (1884) – ultimately equate emotions with bod-
ily perceptions such as hunger or pain (cf. Damasio 1995; Prinz 2004) and 
those which emphasize their character as value judgements and their inherent 
intentionality (cf. Solomon 1993; Nussbaum 2001). However, there is also a 
convergence in understanding emotions as ‘hybrid’ forms of experience which 
comprise both a physical, bodily, and a cognitive mode of getting in touch 
with reality (cf. Jeffery 2011: 147). These approaches thereby acknowledge 
that emotions clearly have a cognitive component without, however, denying 
that there is a difference between emotional experiences and non-emotional 
judgements. The most convincing way of describing the object of emotional 
experience is as a significant change in one’s situation (Ben-Ze’ev 2010: 42; 
44). Since the change of situation does not necessarily concern the experienc-
ing person herself, storytelling – which essentially conveys changes in people’s 
situations – can be a powerful source of emotional experience. 
IR scholars, too, have emphasized that emotions are not purely private ir-
rational phenomena. As Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchison (2008: 123) 
argue, ‘emotions help us make sense of ourselves, and situate us in relation 
to others and the world that surrounds us. They frame forms of personal 
and social understanding, and are thus inclinations that lead individuals to 
locate their identity within a wider collective’. With our focus on right-wing 
populism, appeals to emotion become relevant in several ways. The divide be-
tween technocratic and populist styles of politics has been described with ref-
erence to ‘emotional and passionate performances’ (Moffitt 2016: 46) by the 
populists as opposed to the display of ‘rationality’ by the technocrats. Apart 
from this particular style of politics, populist storytelling both stimulates and 
channels emotions in the audience. On the one hand, it picks up on negative 
feelings such as fear of outsiders and indignation against the ‘elite’, elevating 
them to ‘feeling rules’ (cf. Hochschild 1979) and identifying a lack of such 
emotions as pathological. At the same time, they stimulate countervailing 
positive feelings of belonging, attachment and even love – especially towards 
populist leaders themselves. The growing relevance of narrative analysis is 
also ‘rooted in its ability to serve as a tool for describing events and develop-
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ments without presuming to voice a historical truth’ (Shenhav 2006: 246). A 
narrative analysis switches between the process of narration (e.g. statements) 
and the surrounding narrative structures in cultural repertoires. An ambitious 
narrative analysis should therefore not only consist of a mere description of 
different stories around the subject of investigation (a controversy, a puzzling 
event, a policy problem etc.) but also point out how these narratives affect the 
respective social order in terms of power relations (Kreiswirth 2000: 301). An 
interpretive study of narratives can start from different methodological entry 
points and adopt different approaches (see Czarniawska 2004 and Wagenaar 
2011: 216). 
Following the insights of previous narrative research (e.g. Oppermann and 
Spencer 2018; Gadinger et al. 2019), we have been interested in metaphors, 
since political storytelling – of all different camps – has often tended to ad-
dress matters in terms of urgency. Accordingly, we identified instances of met-
aphors-in-use, which we systematically traced in public statements by popu-
list leaders. The inductive search for metaphors guided our case selection, 
whose narratives we wanted to analyse to illustrate our broader points. While 
there may be many other images and/or metaphors that express resilience 
against the alleged threat of globalization, we have identified two related met-
aphors-in-use across countries and contexts, namely ‘The House’ and ‘The 
Wall’, which belong to similar semantic fields and embody the everyday in 
very fundamental ways. 
As a research strategy, we first analyse our material by identifying the guiding 
metaphors used in connection with various aspects of globalization and inter-
pret them with a focus on their characteristics and embeddedness in cultural 
repertoires of the respective audience. We then analyse the role these meta-
phors play in connection with certain plots, i.e. the sequencing and relating of 
events. These may follow certain patterns, such as decline, rise, rise-and-fall, 
or resurrection, and are connected to characters such as victims, villains, and 
heroes (Oppermann and Spencer 2018: 275). Further, we examine how the 
use of particular metaphors embedded in certain plots contributes to chan-
neling and legitimizing emotions. A reconstruction of narratives that starts 
by contextualizing metaphors and images can add layer upon layer of inter-
pretation in thick descriptions (Yanow 1997: 53). Metaphors and narratives 
are complementary ways of knowing, as a ‘metaphor can bring a point to 
a story while a story can exemplify a metaphor’ (Czarniawska 2004: 108). 
Following Rainer Hülsse (2006: 404), we are not interested in ‘the thinking 
behind metaphors’, the terrain of cognitive linguistics, ‘but in the reality that 
follows from the metaphor use, hence with the effects of metaphors on social 
reality’. For doing narrative analysis by using metaphors as entry-points, the 
insights of classic metaphor analysis (Blumenberg 2010: 1-5) are still relevant. 
That is, metaphors are more than ornamental substitutes for original words, 
which help to describe puzzling events, moments of crisis or confusing policy 
problems. They do more than fulfilling the void of meaning through ‘objec-
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tive’ descriptions of the case. Instead, by constituting the object they signify, 
metaphors create reality and provide descriptive and normative functions for 
further action. The power of metaphors and symbols in more general terms 
lies ‘in their potential to accommodate multiple meanings’ (Yanow 1997: 8). 
Therefore, we aim at grasping the meanings with which they are imbued in 
the specific contexts of populist right-wing anti-globalization storytelling. 
Looking at metaphors from such a perspective comes closer to research ob-
jectives of discourse analysis than the aim of recently popularized cognitive 
frame research (Lakoff and Wehling 2016), which promises to give access to 
the hidden structures of our thinking.  
4 Studying Metaphors in Right-wing Populist  
Storytelling on Anti-globalization
The objective of our two case studies is not a systematic comparison to iden-
tify differences and similarities. We are rather concerned with identifying 
modes of narration across different kinds of political, cultural and historical 
settings, pointing to varieties in political contexts and cultural repertoires. 
What our cases have in common is that they focus on political storytelling by 
individual leaders – in particular Donald Trump and Matteo Salvini – who 
started their campaigns from relatively marginal positions and succeeded in 
winning large shares of the vote – or even, as in the case of Trump, becoming 
heads of states. These successes were surprising for most observers, especially 
in view of the blatant contradictions which their voters had to fend off, such 
as Trump’s benefits from and contributions to neoliberal globalization as well 
as Salvini’s former embrace of Northern Italian secession. While we do not 
claim that narrative analysis can causally explain these surprising victories, 
we do aim at showing how storytelling is an important ingredient of the suc-
cess of these actors and movements, not least in the field of an alleged battle 
against ‘globalism’. It is no coincidence that each of them uses variants of a 
strategy that seeks to build relations to ‘ordinary’ people by using simplified 
language, affective triggers and, most importantly for this paper, imagery ca-
tering to the everyday experience of even the most apolitical person. 
4.1 Inside the house: How Matteo Salvini keeps the world  
outside 
Across Facebook posts, tweets, TV and live performances by right-wing pop-
ulist leaders from Italy, Germany, France, the US, Austria and Brazil, one met-
aphor recurs whenever issues of globalization are mentioned: the house. For 
example, Heinz-Christian Strache of the Austrian Freedom Party, arguably a 
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forerunner to European populist success refers to Austria as a ‘house’ already 
in 2006, by saying that 
The house Austria is a beautiful house. We Austrians and Austrian 
nationals are the exclusive owners of the house Austria. Only the ow-
ners – that is we Austrians – have the right [sic] whether and if yes how 
many guests we let into our house, viz, our guestroom.6  
References to the house as a metaphor of the nation can also be found in 
numerous tweets, speeches and performances by Marine Le Pen7. Similarly, 
Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro compared Brazil to a house in his tweet 
against the Global Compact on Migration (Bolsonaro, 2019). The use of the 
house metaphor is not specific to right-wing populists. In fact, it is also used 
in the context of the EU to describe the community’s identity and to legitimize 
decisions about (non-)membership, for example in the case of Turkey (Hülsse 
2006). In our view, this adaptability of the metaphor attests to its rootedness 
in the respective cultural repertoire and contributes to its appeal when used 
in the context of the right-wing populist narrative of anti-globalization. In the 
following, we will concentrate on one successful populist politician who uses 
this metaphor constantly, namely the Italian head of the Lega Party, former 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Matteo Salvini. 
Inside/outside: The nation as a house 
In numerous tweets, Salvini claims that unchecked migration means bringing 
‘human bombs into our house’ (cf. e.g. Salvini, 2016 May 9). This goes hand 
in hand with a warning that if politics ‘continues like this’ Italians will be 
‘unwanted guests in their own house’ (Salvini, 2015 September 27) or even 
‘refugees in our own house’ (e.g. Salvini, 2016 April 13). Once in power, he 
launched the political project and hashtag ‘chiudiamoiporti’ (‘Let’s close the 
ports’), he explicitly justified his policy of ‘closing’ Italy to the ships carrying 
shipwrecked refugees with the claim that ‘a casa nostra comandiamo noi’ – 
‘in our house we are in command’ (Salvini, 2018 June 16). Thus, the house 
clearly becomes a guiding metaphor for the nation, a space from which the 
dangers of a hostile world can and must be kept out.
Besides metaphorically calling the nation a house, Salvini also connects the 
‘protection of the nation’ with the protection of actual houses. For example, 
in a tweet in which he reports on his speech in front of members of the State 
Police, he honours those who ‘defend our territory and our seas, for the sake 
6 See https://wiev1.orf.at/stories/136746. Unless otherwise noticed, all translations into 
English are ours.
7 E.g. in her interview ‘15 minutes pour convaincre’ on the TV channel France 2 in the run-
up to the presidential elections. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vDXCATj74F4.
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of the serenity of our houses and the dignity of our lands’ (Salvini 2019 April 
16). He emphasizes that he expresses this praise ‘primarily as a man rather 
than as a minister’ (ibid.), thereby foregrounding his own humaneness and 
the importance of the ‘serenity’ of houses. ‘Serenity’ – the feeling of relaxed 
happiness associated with a private life inside the house – becomes the most 
desirable emotional state, which is at the same time in constant need of being 
defended against dangers coming from outside. 
He takes this reference to the actual house one step further in another cam-
paign which he ran on Twitter, Facebook and on TV: ‘Legitimate Defence’, a 
call to make the shooting of any intruder into private property no longer li-
able to prosecution. Already in 2017, Salvini legitimized this project with the 
‘sacred’ character of the house: 
If you are ATTACKED in the most SACRED place, in your house, in 
the midst of what is dear to you, you must be able to DEFEND your-
self. 
(Emphasis in original, Salvini, 2017 March 16)
In the context of the project of the Lega/Cinque Stelle government to de-
criminalize ‘legitimate’ defence, the use of the expression ‘casa mia’ is very 
frequent. Although the connection is hardly ever made explicit by Salvini him-
self, the parallelism is significant: the nation is imagined as a house – from 
which intruders must be kept out. At the same time, it is rendered legal – and 
an obligation – to violently defend actual houses against intruders. Here, an 
emotion norm or feeling rule (Hochschild 1979) of love, fear and indigna-
tion is established through the image of the house: Fear is presented as the 
adequate consequence of the love you feel for ‘what is dear to you’ and must 
be protected. However, as the story continues, it is made impossible for you to 
guarantee this protection, e.g. through rigid arms control or liberal immigra-
tion, which in turn leads to adequate indignation. Since the most basic emo-
tion in this chain is love of the family, it implies that failing to prove that fear 
of the attacker and indignation against the ‘do-gooders’ means a lack of love 
for the family. This feeling rule is then implicitly applied to the nation, the 
house of Italians as a whole. Conversely, supporting the Lega is presented as 
a choice of courage, an adequate emotion induced by the protective instinct: 
I am asking you to make a choice of courage. A vote for the Lega this 
Sunday means more power to close the ports and control the borders 
not only in Italy, but in all of Europe. More power to defend Italian 
businesses and workers through the protection of ‘Made in Italy’.  
(Salvini, 2019 May 26a) 
While presenting it as a natural human instinct to protect one’s house, Salvini 
also emphasizes the typically Italian respect for the sacredness of the house: 
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They would like to cancel the ‘Security Decree’. When in doubt, they 
just add a ‘Salvini Racist’. How sad. In Italy you enter if you have 
the right, in Italy you enter on the tips of your feet, asking ‘permesso’ 
[‘may I’] and ‘per favore’ [please].  
(Salvini, 2019 April 9)
This is one of the few instances in which we see an explicit connection between 
the house as the nation and the physical house, which is expressed through 
the double meaning of the sentence. It can be read as ‘In Italy you enter into 
a private house after asking “permesso”’, which would be an ethnographic 
(and accurate) description of habits expressing the special value attributed to 
the private space in Italy. At the same time, it can mean: ‘You can only enter 
Italy as a nation after asking “permesso”’ – making it clear that whether or 
not refugees or anyone else is let in is at the discretion of the ‘owners’. 
The metaphor of the house is appealing on various levels. On the one hand, 
it alludes to deeply engrained cultural repertoires regarding the sacredness 
of the private space, which can be found, for example, in popular fairy tales 
such as Grimm’s ‘The Wolf and the Seven Young Goats’: the house symbolizes 
the protected space of the family of the seven little goats, which is constantly 
threatened by the presence of the wolf. The catastrophe is brought upon them 
when the wolf succeeds in convincing them through deceit to let him into this 
space. The structure reappears in many different political and literary texts, 
including the famous play ‘The Fire Raisers’ (1948) by German playwright 
Max Frisch (also known as ‘The Arsonists’ or ‘The Firebugs’): it tells the story 
of ‘Biedermann’ or ‘everyman’, a naïve, petty, bourgeois inhabitant of a town 
which has recently been attacked by firebugs. In an attempt to evade such a 
fate, he accepts two salesmen into his house and allows them to live on the 
attic. The two however, show ever more clearly by words and deeds that they 
themselves are the fire raisers, which, Biedermann constantly fails to realize. 
Eventually, after his failure to stop them from their evil intents, they set the 
house ablaze. While the play has often been interpreted as an allegorical ren-
dering of the seduction of the naïve ‘everyman’ by the lures of fascism, it has 
also been used by right wing populists to instigate fear and hatred of immi-
grants, under the motto ‘The do-gooder and the refugees-welcome’, thereby 
assigning to the refugees the role of the abstract but imminent danger of de-
struction (cf. Warszawski 2016). 
With these references we do not claim that each and every recipient of Sal-
vini’s narratives, or even Salvini himself, knows each singular text which takes 
up this deep-rooted tradition. Rather, we argue that his invocation of the 
‘House’ as a metaphor of the nation taps into this rich cultural repertoire. 
Precisely its pertinence to this diffuse and deep-rooted imaginary makes it 
immediately plausible and helps to gloss over the more openly inhumane and 
racist agendas with which it is combined. 
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At the same time, the reference to the ‘House’ also plays with the role of hous-
ing as a basic human need, which is becoming ever more precarious. Given 
the links between a lack of housing and human misery, marginalisation and 
deprivation, the possibilities of conceiving ‘housing’ as a basic human right 
have been discussed (cf. Hohman 2013). The precariousness of housing has 
also been exacerbated by the 2007/8 financial crisis, in the course of which 
more and more families were threatened with eviction or could no longer af-
ford to acquire real estate property due to restrictions on credit (cf. e.g. Di 
Quirico 2010). While none of this features prominently in Salvini’s narratives, 
it is nevertheless part of the social, political and economic context which 
renders the importance and precariousness of housing immediately plausible. 
The plot and the hero: Salvini makes ‘control’ possible again 
The story told around the nation as a house follows the pattern of a ‘resur-
rection plot’ (cf. Mayer 2014: 60 f.): According to the story, the ‘house’ – or 
nation – was invaded by dangerous migrants and criminals in general and 
thereby almost destroyed. Importantly, Italians – ‘inhabitants of the house’ – 
were held back from closing their ports by hostile ‘external’ forces, such as 
the EU and naïve internal actors, called ‘buonisti’ or do-gooders. The same 
plot characterizes the parallel programme of introducing ‘legitimate defence’: 
In both cases, Salvini presents himself as the one who rendered ‘defence’ pos-
sible again – against intruders of actual houses through ‘legittima difesa’ and 
against migrants and ‘criminals’ from abroad – through the ‘chiudiamo i por-
ti’ policy. 
This concentration on him as the hero who guarantees and embodies the res-
toration of control is rendered in various ways. Before his electoral victory, he 
emphasized that ‘everyone is silent’ (Salvini, 2016 May 9) in the face of the 
dangers of bringing in ‘human bombs’. After he assumed power he made sure 
that the ‘closed ports’ policy was directly associated with him personally: The 
hashtag ‘chiudiamo i porti’ featured a picture of him in the pose of a bouncer 
or customs officer, standing up straight with his arms crossed over his chest, 
making it clear that he will let no one in (Salvini, 2018 June 10).  
This statement is reiterated in comments on the ‘porti chiusi’ policy suggest-
ing that ‘as long as I am Minister […] – rest assured, this policy won’t change’ 
(Salvini, 2019 April 20). With this ‘rest assured’ (‘tranquilli’) he literally tells 
people how to feel – insinuating, at the same time that he is needed as a guar-
antor for the policy of closed ports to stay in place. The same mechanism 
is used for alleged threats to private property of the house: ‘As long as I am 
minister, there will be no hereditary taxes on the house or on savings’ (Salvini, 
2019 May 9a). 
The notion of ownership and private property is in turn applied to the na-
tion. In the context of requests by the Italian Marine to give them access to 
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Italian ports because of the shipwrecked refugees on board their ships, Salvini 
repeatedly emphasizes his refusal. In a statement reported in the daily news-
paper Repubblica and repeated on his twitter account, he stated ‘Porti non ne 
do’ – ‘I will not give any ports’ – thereby presenting himself as the owner of 
the ports, who – just like the owner of a house – can decide entirely freely to 
whom he gives access and to whom he denies it (Salvini, 2019 May 9b).  
This resonates with the worldview in which all threats are conceived as com-
ing from the outside. For example, in connection with advertising his bill, 
entitled ‘decreto sicurezza bis’, Salvini states that the bill is concerned with 
‘human traffickers, camorrists, and delinquents’ (Salvini, 2019 May 12), put-
ting the clearly homegrown strands of organized crime such as the Camorra 
in one box with the ‘traffickers’ who bring migrants to Italy. In the run-up to 
the European Parliament elections, Salvini even coined a slogan referring to 
the entirety of external threats and adverse forces: ‘Stop Burocrati – Banchieri 
– Buonisti – Barconi’ (Salvini, 2019 May 26b). So ‘bureaucrats, bankers, do-
gooders and boats’ are lumped together to designate the whole of what must 
be ‘stopped’ in order to resolve the problems Italy is facing. He created one of 
the personifications of this quadruple force of evil in Carola Rackete, who in 
June 2019 docked the rescue ship ‘Sea-Watch 3’ at Lampedusa harbour with-
out authorization. In numerous posts, he stylized her into his villain antipode, 
calling her ‘criminal’, ‘rich’, ‘spoiled’ and a ‘pirate’8. 
While immigration features most prominently in this pattern, the ‘Burocrati 
…’ slogan shows that it is also extended to the economy. Accordingly, Sal-
vini tweeted: ‘I want an Italy that grows, and in the last 10 years the absurd 
European rules have made debt and unemployment rise’ (Salvini, 2019 May 
29). Thus, the manifest crises of debt and unemployment are not negated, but 
externalized. The resurrection plot suggested in connection with immigration 
is repeated, but here clearly rendered as a promise for the future: ‘I want to 
do with the economy what we have done with immigration’ (Salvini, 2019 
May 27). 
Another layer of narrating Salvini as a ‘hero’ and gatekeeper who defends 
the house is added in connection with the ‘legittima difesa’ law: while on the 
one hand he emphasizes that the law spelled out a universal, even ‘sacred’ 
right, on the other hand, he constantly presents it as his ‘gift’ to the Italian 
people. Shortly after the approval of the respective law he declared himself 
to be ‘PROUD to have given to Italians the sacred right to defend themselves 
in their own house’ (Salvini, 2019 April 3, emphasis in original). The verb he 
uses is not ‘dare’ (to give) but ‘regalare’, which explicitly refers to the act of 
giving a gift. The tension between the ‘sacred right’ and the fact that he ‘gave’ 
it to Italians as a gift seems to go unobserved in the context of a strong resur-
rection plot and a convincing hero character. 
8 See https://www.liberoquotidiano.it/news/italia/13482427/sea-watch-3-carola-rackete-
angela-merkel-rifiutato-soccorso.html. 
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Besides celebrating himself for turning that law into a reality, Salvini also 
narrates instances of individual caring. This can be seen in the case of a tweet 
reporting a phone call with Fredy Pacini, a tire dealer who had killed a 29 
year old intruder on his property and had faced charges of bodily injury. Al-
though the proceedings against Pacini were ultimately closed and he himself 
declared to be ‘heart-broken’ after what happened – Salvini still stylizes him 
as a hero of ‘legitimate defence’ and celebrates himself for calling Pacini on 
the phone (Salvini, 2019 May 15). This story, as well as others, portray him 
in the role of the caring ‘father’ of the citizens. This idea is reinforced by the 
numerous tweets in which he expresses ‘affetto’ (affection) for his followers, 
thanks them for their support and tells them that he ‘loves’ them (Salvini, 
2019 February 3). 
This invocation of ‘affetto’ is combined with images and stories which con-
jure up an atmosphere of serenity, such as in countless tweets and Facebook 
posts which contain pictures of typical Italian food and drinks, as well as 
animals, children and fl owers. An example is the following picture: 
Here, we see a diagonal close-up of Matteo Salvini, smiling happily through 
the twigs of a bouquet, posing in front of a simple, shiny beige wall. He is 
wearing a black jacket, which, thanks to its label saying ‘Polizia Penitenziar-
ia’, can be identifi ed as belonging to the uniform of the Italian prison guards. 
The image, while at fi rst sight looking almost naïve and less-than-heroic, nev-
ertheless caters to the role he is constructing for himself : on the one hand, 
it suggests the intimacy of a Facebook post or WhatsApp message, normally 
directed at one’s family or friends instead of citizens and voters: The sunfl ow-
ers of the bouquet look a bit battered, the diagonal perspective is typical 
of smartphone snapshots as opposed to offi cial photography and the back-
ground suggests an interior setting. At the same time, however, his display 
Image 1: @matteosalvinimi [tweet]
https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1092186194379792384/photo/1, 3 February 2019
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of the prison guards’ uniform continues the long series of images featuring 
him wearing a police uniform, which sends several political messages: beyond 
symbolizing his support for those who ensure law and order ‘on the ground’, 
it also aims at blurring the boundaries between him as an individual and the 
state institution of the police, insinuating not only that he ‘personifies’ legality 
and security but also that the police belongs to him (Saviano, 2019). 
We can add another layer of interpretation by taking into account the text 
with which the image is combined in the same tweet and which takes up the 
theme of the ‘house’: 
Thank you for the affect you are showing me every day [heart-emoti-
con]. Now about to go home, shower, pyjama, salami sandwich, a beer 
and … Super Bowl in TV. 
(Salvini, 2019 February 3)
Therefore, Salvini clearly stylizes himself as the ‘normal guy’, who, after a day 
of hard work is longing for the comfort of a home, which provides rest, food 
and distraction. Importantly, his evening activities are not sophisticated, he 
does not read novels or eat sushi, but are very ‘down to earth’. The mentioning 
of ‘pane e salame’ or ‘salami sandwich’ is not random: It refers to an Italian, 
pork-based snack, which, as he mentions on other occasions, is delegitimized 
by those he labels as the ‘politically correct’ (Salvini, 2017 July 2). All in all, 
however, his joyful anticipation of an evening of rest at home, conjure up the 
‘serenity’ of the house, which, as already mentioned, he constantly presents as 
threatened and in need of defence. 
In parallel to stylizing himself as the loving father of the nation, he also em-
phasizes his role as an actual father, regularly posting short stories about him 
having dinner with his family, his son doing well at school or him spending 
time with his daughter. These demonstrations of ‘affect’, however, are strictly 
confined to his actual family and the circle of his supporters. For all others, he 
reserves his fearlessness and determination, emphasizing that he is constantly 
being attacked by ‘strong enemies’ (Salvini, 2019 May 17).  
This dichotomized self-stylization reflects the separation of a world into an 
inside and an outside: Salvini is the loving ‘father’ in his relationship to the 
‘inside’ – the family, the nation – and the fearless ‘defender’ vis-à-vis a hos-
tile world outside the house. In some instances, this juxtaposition is illustrat-
ed through respective tweets following directly after another: For example, 
shortly before the elections for the European Parliament, he first posted a pic-
ture of himself, carrying his daughter Mirta on his shoulders, posing behind 
a cow on a green meadow, the caption reading ‘Me, Mirta and our friend, the 
cow. What a splendid day’ (Salvini, 2019 26c). The tweet was followed im-
mediately by one featuring a video on the deportation of a criminal foreigner, 
the screenshot of the video showing a close-up of the criminal, his eyes staring 
directly at the beholder. The comment in the respective tweet reads: 
21
Everything but humanitarian protection! Thanks to the Salvini decree 
this DELINQUENT (who had declared himself underage in order to 
ask for protection) will be sent back HOME. With a strong Lega on 
Sunday ZERO TOLERANCE for those who do not flee from war but 
bring it to us in Italy instead. 
(Emphasis in original. Salvini, 2019 May 26)
Taken together, the two tweets make for both a resurrection plot and a sub-
tle menace: the bucolic landscape of the green meadow and the ‘friend cow’ 
stands for the restauration of a life in harmony and ease under the guidance 
of ‘Salvini the father’ – which – however, is only possible thanks to the aggres-
sive actions of ‘Salvini the defender’, who ‘keeps out’ and ‘pushes back’, and it 
will last only as long as he is supported: Failure to do so will inevitably lead 
back to a situation of insecurity.  
As is well known, in late August 2019, Salvini maneuvered himself out of 
power. In a sort of failed Machiavellian coup, he broke the alliance with the 
Cinque Stelle party, hoping to provoke immediate elections that would en-
dow him with what he ominously called ‘pieni poteri’ or ‘full-fledged power’. 
Instead, it led to a change of alliances in the parliament, which relegated him 
and his party to the opposition. However, with this change of position, he 
shifted his rhetoric only partly. It remains characterized by the same meta-
phors, the plot now being extended by the motif of ‘treason’. He continues 
to stylize himself as the defender of the nation against intruders from the 
outside, now also paying attention to their allies ‘within the house’. One op-
portunity to insist on this personified friend/foe distinction was provided by a 
live interview by Carola Rackete in Italian TV. On this occasion, he called her 
the ‘idol of our own leftists’ (Salvini, 2019 September 19), thereby emphasiz-
ing that there are some ‘sinistri’, i.e. ‘sinister’ leftists, within the house of the 
nation. The whole tweet reads as follows: 
Have you heard the idol of our own left preach live on TV? With an 
attitude of superiority she informed us about her indifference with 
regard to Italian politics: She is an ‘ecologist’ and wants to save the 
planet and humanity from rising temperatures. (ibid.)
By ridiculing the connection she established between climate change and mi-
gration in the concerned interview, and by pointing to her refusal to engage 
with Italian politics, Salvini aims at downplaying her relevance. Not only is 
‘ecologist’ put in inverted commas, but her interest in the world as a whole is 
presented as a sufficient proof that her agenda is irrelevant for Italy. In spite 
of her alleged irrelevance, Carola Rackete is, again, referred to as the perfect 
‘villain’ in Salvini’s narrative. This role is emphasized in the following image, 
which was posted as a collage: 
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Several elements underline the contrast between the two: While Salvini is sur-
rounded by a cheering crowd of supporters, some of whom are wearing the 
Lega’s typical green, reaching out to him and taking his picture, the screen-
shot from the interview shows Carola Rackete in front of an inhospitable 
mountain massif recalling a wavy sea. While Salvini is shown as smiling at 
his supporters, the chosen screenshot of the Rackete interview shows her with 
a distanced gaze. Thus, the dichotomy that is created is one between popu-
larity and loneliness, between the humble and accessible ‘worker’ and the 
arrogant and remote activist, between the ‘hero’ who is part of a vibrant 
movement and the villain who has lost touch with reality. Importantly, the 
different backgrounds of the pictures stand for a community held together by 
Salvini within the ‘house’ of the nation, and a bleak and inhospitable world 
on the outside which must be prevented from interfering with the inside. The 
reference to the admirers of the ‘idol’ Carola Rackete even ‘at home’ (a ‘casa 
nostra’) only emphasizes the situation of threat and the necessity of a ‘strong-
man’ such as Salvini. 
Image 2: @matteosalvinimi [tweet]  
https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1174798828760895488/photo/1, 19 September 2019 
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4.2 The Wall – Which might or might not be built
We find references to similar narratives in the use of the metaphor of ‘The 
Wall’ (see also Brown 2014), which has been a strong mobilizing element in 
US politics, at least during the time of Donald Trump’s election campaign.9 
Although the omnipresence of the ‘The Wall’ is most perspicuous in Donald 
Trump’s speeches before and after his election, it has also been referred to in 
Europe, notably by the leader of Vox, the Spanish populist, right-wing party, 
Santiago Abascal. Abascal not only emphasized the need for a physical wall 
to be built around the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla, he also called for 
the erection of a ‘psychological wall’ (‘muro psicológico’) against immigrants, 
which would prevent them from hoping they could ever gain access to the 
Spanish labour market or social security system. 10
Under the Trump administration, the idea of building a wall has structured 
many recent debates, caused the longest government shutdown in US Ameri-
can history (in early 2019), and remains a key point of contention between 
the two political camps. The Wall – similar to the House – clearly refers to a 
very real, material thing, but at the same time functions as a metaphor with 
a variety of different meanings that can be accessed easily. These layers of 
meaning attached to the wall in its material and symbolic dimensions can be 
seen as instrumental in mobilizing support for the election of US President 
Trump. The following sub-chapter will show how the mutual dependence of 
both dimensions of ‘the Wall’ serves to strengthen the social meaning of the 
metaphor, which has been employed for a variety of anti-global causes but 
necessarily refers to a concrete and material thing that is meant to come into 
existence. Or, as has been stressed many times now, already exists in some 
parts of the US11. The mediation between the two, the symbolic and the mate-
rial, causes an interesting friction in terms of narrative analysis that we will 
try to explore in the following. 
A first step of approaching the Wall and its ambiguous meaning is by contex-
tualizing the metaphor in the political framework of its use. For instance, we 
can look at the main proponent, President Trump. Trump represents a type 
of political leader with numerous stories about himself that seem to have an 
appeal to his voters beyond any political programme. These stories proclaim 
him to be a ‘self-made man’ (which is blatantly false) or ‘intelligent’ and many 
other things that would be hard to prove. Nevertheless, these strong claims 
seem to resonate with his constituents, as many campaign performances show 
enthusiastic audiences that applaud every bit of self-praise that Trump deliv-
9 See, for instance https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-37241284. 
10 See https://www.diariodesevilla.es/espana/Vox-Abascal-Muro-Ceuta-Melilla-pague-
Marruecos_0_1340866052.html. 
11 See https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/05/us/border-wall.html. 
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ers. His political agenda similarly builds on a few selected stories, some of 
them election campaign promises, which seem to have exerted a strong im-
pact on voting decisions. Interestingly, some of the key stories can be identi-
fied as anti-global in our understanding. Among them, there is the promise 
of building a ‘wall’ against immigration (and various other activities) across 
the Southern Border and, extending the metaphor, references to the strong 
preference for a traditional system of national tariffs on foreign goods stand 
out. Others, such as ‘draining the swamp’, i.e. changing the corrupt state of 
politics in Washington, or getting rid of ‘Obamacare’, have a lesser connection 
to our understanding of globalization. 
The material and the symbolic dimensions of the Wall
Seen by political opponents as a ‘vanity’ or ‘pet’ project, the Wall has been 
instrumental for Trump’s overall agenda of America First or ‘Make America 
Great Again’ (MAGA), precisely because of its double meaning. Many objec-
tions to the Wall as a material entity have been made, but seem to have little 
effect on the charisma of the metaphor. The ‘ontological indifference’ of meta-
phors, as said earlier, allows for such inconsistencies. For instance, on the level 
of discussions about the potential usefulness of a border wall on the Southern 
end of the US, data supports the assessment that concerning the perceived 
threat of drug and arms trafficking, not much will be achieved by fencing off 
further parts of the terrain. Most of the illegal trafficking is conducted via the 
existing borders, circumventing the present control mechanisms. Even illegal 
immigration, projections have shown, cannot be managed more effectively 
simply by building a border fortification, since neither deterrence nor the pre-
vention of factual crossings could be achieved. More even, as a recent article 
in Forbes magazine puts it: 
However, there appears to be a logical disconnect between insisting a 
wall will stop illegal immigration and at the same time increasing the 
number of Border Patrol agents. Simply put, if a wall was 99.9% effec-
tive in stopping illegal entry, then there would be little work for Border 
Patrol agents to do.12 
This logical inconsistency, however, is only one reservation that has been con-
veniently ignored and begs the question of why the claim that a wall can 
achieve all of these goals continues to be an important topic of Trump’s public 
communications.
A next factual problem with the Wall concerns historical precedent, as allud-
ed to in the above article. The claimed effectiveness of walls in recent history 
12 See https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2019/01/28/nobody-believes-a-wall- 
will-stop-illegal-immigration/#576f04b13b16. 
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is, evidently, exaggerated – no wall is 99.9% ‘effective’ in preventing illegal 
border-crossings. Whether numbers even exist on how successfully a wall can 
achieve what it was meant to do or not, is also unclear. The claim to the con-
trary, therefore, possibly has a different rationale. This seems to be emotional 
rather than factual, in the sense that a wall needs to suggest maximum secu-
rity to those inside (once a clear outside has been demarcated), which makes 
it a promise of guaranteed protection, not unlike that of a parent to a child. 
A third, but somewhat different factual problem with the Wall13 is the mate-
rial nature of its construction. In terms of implementation, the concrete plan 
of building a wall has now been transformed into building a steel barrier or 
fence, and yet the idea of a wall – in its many connotations – is being kept 
alive. Furthermore, the Wall’s main proponent, Trump, seems unfazed by the 
incommensurability of his claims. Trump, in the news agency picture below, 
is seen sitting behind a desk in an office, possibly in the White House. He is 
seated between what seem to be two members of the US military, wearing a 
black suit, a red and black tie and a pin of the US flag on his lapel. Caught 
mid-talk (his mouth forming the now well-known moue), he holds up a paper 
in landscape format, apparently to underline a point he wants to make about 
his plan to have a border wall built. The paper shows a rather old-fashioned 
printout colour picture that depicts the construction of a barrier, exemplified 
by a construction vehicle and muddy ground, foregrounding a long fence on 
the right-hand side, going into a bleak, light horizon. The heading that intro-
duces the picture of this steel barrier reads ‘Typical Standard Wall Design’.
When we start interpreting this headline that introduces the picture within 
the picture, the most interesting insight is that it proclaims not only what is 
‘typical’ but also what is ‘standard’ design. Obviously, the redundancy of us-
ing both words that roughly mean the same thing is not coincidental. Another 
thing that stands out is that we read ‘wall’, even though we clearly see a bar-
rier made of steel. Notably, the text thus claims that we, in fact, see a ‘wall’, 
and, even more, that this ‘wall’ is standard, while actually being a steel fence. 
In order to understand why these highly illogical and, to add, false claims 
can be made without provoking major contradictions, we need to include the 
symbolic layers of the Wall into our interpretation. 
In the combination of the picture and its caption, we can identify attempts to 
render commensurable the metaphorical idea of the Wall with the actual pro-
ject of erecting a steel barrier, evidently for reasons of feasibility. Since using 
redundant adjectives creates a tautology and since calling a barrier a wall is 
simply a false claim, we can assume that this is a classic attempt at interpretive 
closure, i.e. a case of overriding concerns about reality by presenting a strong 
fantasy. A steel barrier is neither a typical nor a standard type of a wall, but 
13 Henceforth, we will refer to the Wall when talking about the metaphorical project, and 
to wall when talking about walls in general. 
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just a completely different thing. In terms of the narrative context, we learn 
that maintaining the impression that there is still a plan to build a wall – in 
spite of all technical, financial, political adversities – and that this Wall – that 
is not a wall – will achieve what it promises, is crucial.
Yet, how can this be achieved? One way of stabilizing the symbolic meaning 
of the Wall has been the personal communications by Trump via his Twit-
ter account that reaches millions of people, many of whom support him. An 
analysis of all tweets that contain mentions of the Wall, going back to the 
beginning of Trump’s presidency (in the awareness that even before that point 
in time these tweets existed), shows that the motifs used to render the Wall a 
central political project are highly repetitive. As a first pattern, the attempts 
at reconciling the above-mentioned contradictions can be traced in many 
tweets, among them those written during the time of the government shut-
down caused by Trump’s demands for money to build the Wall, which was 
refused by the opposition (led by Nancy Pelosi and Chuck Schumer, who are 
mentioned in the tweet), which in turn led to a refusal by Trump to reopen 
negotiations. The tweet reads: 
A big new Caravan is heading up to our Southern Border from Hon-
duras. Tell Nancy and Chuck that a drone flying around will not stop 
them. Only a Wall will work. Only a Wall, or Steel Barrier, will keep 
our Country safe! Stop playing political games and end the Shutdown! 
(Trump, 2019 January 15)
Re-emphasizing earlier utterances (i.e. tweets) about the necessity of building 
a Wall, Trump acknowledges that even though ‘Only a Wall will work’, this 
wall in fact is a ‘steel barrier’. Pragmatically, these sentences make little sense. 
If only a wall will work, it is pointless to have a steel barrier. Yet, since the 
Wall will factually come in the form of a steel barrier, this contradiction can-
not be resolved and must thus be overridden by symbolic, fantastic messages. 
One narrative reference of this fantastic dimension is the fictitious idea of a 
‘Caravan’, threatening to cross the border; the nameless, faceless group of mi-
grants moving towards the border has repeatedly been named as a key danger. 
A metaphor in itself, the Caravan could be exchanged for any kind of other 
threats (as logical equivalents) that have been referenced, including criminal 
gangs, drugs, weapons and so on, as long as the inside/outside divide is suf-
ficiently invoked. Since the factual argument would not withstand further 
questioning, the metaphor of preventable threats can camouflage consistency 
concerns. 
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Layers of the symbolic 
Even more things can be learned from this one tweet. The Democrat leaders 
‘Nancy and Chuck’,  are relegated to incompetent minor characters of the 
looming crisis. Their stupid ideas of ‘drone flying’ have not contributed to 
solving the ‘Caravan’ crisis. Instead, them ‘playing political games’ has cre-
ated even greater urgency to act – i.e. to build the Wall. In this instance, the 
symbolic dimension of the Wall comes to the fore: it represents a crisis that 
needs little further description. The country’s safety, and nothing less, is at 
stake, while the Wall is still not being built. Since the Wall has been a topic 
in Donald Trump’s campaign for now roughly three years, the urgency is not 
entirely credible. The metaphor of the Wall, however, derives its strength from 
the symbolism of walls that represent strength and steadfastness, countering 
any situation of crisis. A more explicit reference to the fantastic dimension of 
the Wall can be found in the following image, tweeted by Trump: 
The above picture shows an arrangement of Trump posing as builder of the 
‘Wall’, a larger-than-life figure seen against a dark purple background. In the 
front, at the bottom, we see a vast landscape cut horizontally by a steel fence, 
vaguely showing a landscape or settlement on the far horizon. Trump is por-
trayed with a dignified, earnest look, god-like and looming above the semi-
transparent steel fence in a desert-like area. The accompanying text reads ‘The 
Wall is Coming’. The text, we can assume, references the widely known HBO 
show ‘Game of Thrones’, which popularized the slogan ‘Winter is Coming’ 
and simultaneously featured a wall that plays a central role in the plot. Ironi-
cally, that wall proves unable to provide protection against the evil forces of 
the Night King and his army of undead, and is the battleground for various 
Image 3: @realDonaldTrump [tweet] 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1081735898679701505/photo/1, 6 Jan. 2019. 
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bitter fights of different groups that, in fact, are never fully deterred or hin-
dered by the wall (Benioff and Weiss, 2011–2019).
Again, even at a first glance, the cognitive dissonance of talking about a wall 
while showing a fence (or barrier) is striking. The presentation in a pop-cul-
turally pleasing manner, however, contributes to distracting from this flaw. 
Using this strong slogan and the depiction of a, for once, presidentially ar-
ranged president serves to distract the viewers’ attention away from the in-
consistency.
On a more general level, the various dangers that could be blocked out by the 
Wall before they even reach the US are crucial to the success of the fantasy of 
the Wall. Here, the underlying assumption, that the inside/outside distinction 
automatically needs to favour the inside, comes to the fore. 
...Remember this. Throughout the ages some things NEVER get bet-
ter and NEVER change. You have Walls and you have Wheels. It was 
ALWAYS that way and it will ALWAYS be that way! Please explain to 
the Democrats that there can NEVER be a replacement for a good old 
fashioned WALL! 
(Emphasis in capital letters in original; emphasis in bold added.  
Trump, 2019 January 1) 
This is underlined by recurring claims that walls are timeless, time-tested 
and always the right means. The formulations ‘never’ and ‘always’, again, 
are strong attempts at narrative closure. The tweet posits the wall as a ma-
jor invention in human history, similar to the wheel (or in Trump’s diction: 
‘wheels’). The strongly underlined use of ‘always’ and ‘never’ as markers of 
universal truth carry the specific project of Trump’s wall across history – or 
‘throughout the ages’ – to mean more than the actual steel barrier factually 
could. 
There are several tweets in that fashion, for example:
The Democrats are trying to belittle the concept of a Wall, calling it 
old fashioned. The fact is there is nothing else’s [sic] that will work, 
and that has been true for thousands of years. It’s like the wheel, there 
is nothing better. I know tech better than anyone, & technology ...  
(Trump, 2018 December 21)
Political claims that are anchored in generalizing narratives such as the histor-
ical (or, even stronger, ahistorical) value of walls pre-empt any form of criti-
cism by denying their validity. Funny enough, while the tweet states that ‘there 
can NEVER be a replacement for a good old fashioned Wall’, the history of 
steel fences is much less impressive and thus, once more, a contradiction in 
terms. The opposition of old and new (as inside and outside) favours old over 
new, stressing that threats caused by newer phenomena such as migration (as 
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a consequence of globalization) can be countered by relying on old means. 
Moreover, a formulation like ‘that has been true for thousands of years’ sug-
gests that Trump is knowledgeable and has expertise in the matter of walls 
(and beyond, a self-proclaimed expertise in technology). 
Drawing attention to the fact that a wall could be considered ‘old fashioned’ 
(or outdated, as critics might want to add), Trump caters to traditionalists 
that seem to make up a good portion of his supporters, a conservative pub-
lic, who by definition distrust change and newness. The Wall thus becomes a 
symbol of timeless, almost apolitical action and evidences that Trump alone 
has been able to understand and deliver a quality product like the Wall. The 
fantasy of walls as protective constructions is thus reinforced by the narrative 
context of timelessness, tradition and historical experience. 
The narrative context
Now, why has it become so important for Trump to defend the idea of a 
wall? Besides the obvious, namely the output legitimacy of keeping a political 
promise, we seek for the answer in adding another narrative layer to under-
stand the symbolic meaning of the Wall in its cultural context. In a next step 
we thus ask why the idea of a Wall is so central in Trump’s political storytell-
ing. There are several possible and plausible answers that have very much to 
do with the role that Trump plays as a key character in a narrative of hero-
ism in the face of adversity (the decline of the US due to an evil, globalized 
environment), and can also be reasoned to provide a culturally accessible 
entry point to a more complex narrative. We would argue that there is an 
implicit anti-global stance in the narrative that creates the storyline of threat 
or danger needed to give the hero (Trump) a sufficiently evil adversary he can 
overcome. While we find rather explicit statements by conservative politicians 
in support of Trump about why globalization (in some of its facets) presents a 
threat to the US, and similar statements by Trump himself, for the purpose of 
this paper, we prefer the more indirect path of selecting elements that are only 
implicitly part of ‘globalization’. At the same time, the heroic story of Trump 
as a protector of American greatness only makes sense against a background 
of believable threats, which need to be more concrete than the highly abstract 
globalization. Therefore, anti-immigration and anti-free trade, which feature 
in our analysis, are vital parts of an anti-globalization storyline.
The plot is a well-known one, in which a single man – the cowboy, the king 
or any such male figure of a lone leader – needs to act to protect his villagers/
subjects etc. The threat against which he offers protection remains more or 
less faceless, but imminent. To some extent, there is even an interchangeability 
of different threats, as long as the hero remains the same. Again, drawing on 
Trump’s numerous tweets, we find different adversaries on offer: 
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Border rancher: ‘We’ve found prayer rugs out here. It’s unreal.’ Wash-
ington Examiner People coming across the Southern Border from 
many countries, some of which would be a big surprise. 
(Emphasis added. Trump, 2019 January 18)
... The Steel Barrier, or Wall, should have been built by previous ad-
ministrations long ago. They never got it done – I will. Without it, our 
Country cannot be safe. Criminals, Gangs, Human Traffickers, Drugs 
& so much other big trouble can easily pour in. It can be stopped 
cold! 
(Trump, 2019 January 11)
Mexico should move the flag waving Migrants, many of whom are 
stone cold criminals, back to their countries. Do it by plane, do it by 
bus, do it anyway you want, but they are NOT coming into the U.S.A. 
We will close the Border permanently if need be. Congress, fund the 
WALL! 
(Emphasis in capital letters in original; emphasis in bold added.  
Trump, 2018 November 11)
Migrants and crime, Muslims (hinted to by the reference to allegedly find-
ing ‘prayer rugs’) and terrorists, drug and human traffickers, gangs etc. are 
equalized as threats without any further explanation, since there is no need 
for one. Anything beyond the borders of the US potentially presents a threat, 
particularly when there is a high likelihood that there is an imminent danger 
of border crossing. In light of an endemic opioid crisis and various recent 
instances of mass killings due to home-grown terrorism, which have both 
been acknowledged as being among the more urgent problems the US faces, 
it is striking that a wall on the Southern border should be able to do anything 
to counter these threats. As stated above, we would read this interpretation, 
which is conveyed in numerous tweets and public utterances, as an attempt at 
externalizing these (inherited) challenges to make them seem as though they 
did not originate inside the US but outside. Pointing to a vague, but imminent 
danger of all things foreign – as effects of globalization – thus exonerates 
Donald Trump of acting against domestic crises such as the opioid crisis. In-
stead, narrating these problems as belonging ‘outside’ allows him to propose 
the Wall as a cure-all against them and pushing away political responsibility. 
On top of that, the general idea seems to be a suggestion that the world – eve-
rything outside the safety zone of a reinvigorated US – is dangerous and has 
to be kept out. Any influx – of goods, people, ideas, obligations etc. – needs to 
be controlled and adapted to the needs of Americans. In that, there is no real 
difference between the Wall and, to take another one of Trump’s key prom-
ises, trade tariffs that also function as barriers to protect what is inside, what 
needs to be maintained and is too precious to risk. 
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We are either going to have a REAL DEAL with China, or no deal at 
all - at which point we will be charging major Tariffs against Chinese 
product being shipped into the United States. Ultimately, I believe, we 
will be making a deal - either now or into the future.... ....China does 
not want Tariffs!
(Trump, 2018 December 5)
... I am a Tariff Man. When people or countries come in to raid the 
great wealth of our Nation, I want them to pay for the privilege of do-
ing so. It will always be the best way to max out our economic power. 
We are right now taking in $billions in Tariffs. MAKE AMERICA 
RICH AGAIN. 
(Trump, 2018 December 4)
While there is a significant difference between tariffs and the Wall, which 
can be further discussed, there is a large overlap in the way that threats are 
presented, whether it is people and goods entering the US via the border, or 
‘people or countries com[ing] in to raid the great wealth’ of the US. In nar-
rating a story of danger and heroic protection, Trump makes little distinction 
between the two.
A closer look at the history and present state of walls in general, of course, re-
veals much greater ambiguity and internal contradictions to the simple story 
of success that Trump has presented. The plot and role construction go back 
to archaic patterns of stories we are familiar with. Builders of ancient walls 
such as the Limes in Great Britain (Hadrian’s Wall) or the Great Wall of Chi-
na, fortified by the first Chinese emperor Qin Shi Huang, outlive their human 
lives in the memory of their people. Therefore, building a wall serves to signal 
agency, and more specifically masculinity – since building is mainly seen as a 
male activity – as well as potential historical greatness. The fact that Trump’s 
wealth stems from his construction business (in which he also failed several 
times) only adds to the personal appeal of building a wall, since this is his core 
area of expertise. The image of a builder and protector, again both inherently 
male preoccupations, characterizes Trump’s role in his story about the wall 
and tariffs; he is in control of America’s fate, whereas the rest of the world has 
only tried to take away the wealth and greatness of the US – and will fail to do 
so because of Trump’s deeds. The vague hope that Trump will be remembered 
by name, since he succeeded with a project that helped to ‘Make America 
Great Again’ is part of the appeal and possibly a reason for Trump’s insistence 
on building the wall against all resistance he has faced.
With regard to the Wall as a metaphor that allows for associations with anti-
globalization, Wendy Brown argues (2014) that the idea of using walls to 
delineate and thus protect territory against perceived dangers has resurfaced 
and proliferated, also considering them means to address challenges to sover-
eignty as repercussions of globalization. Particularly, debates in Israel, which 
erected a border fence and new border posts towards the Palestinian terri-
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tories, come to mind. In that case, different from the US example, an open, 
extremely violent conflict was given as justification (by the Israeli govern-
ment) for the border fortification; the project remains highly contested, since 
violence continues and structural violence may have been exacerbated by the 
wall itself. As for earlier modern incidences of border fortifications, the Ber-
lin Wall is certainly the most iconic one. Here, the smaller entity, namely the 
German Democratic Republic in the East sealed itself off against the larger, 
capitalist German Federal Republic in order to protect itself from the vari-
ous detrimental outside influences. This Wall was also called the ‘anti-fascist 
protective wall’, owing to the idea that Western Germany inherited the legacy 
of Germany’s national-socialist past, while Eastern Germany was politically 
pure and needed protection. The Berlin Wall was, however, commonly seen as 
a symbol of wrongful separation. 
This perspective matters because the proposition of a Wall is clearly not an 
endeavour driven by concerns of functionality. Explicit references to the Is-
raeli ‘wall’ in Trump’s tweets evoke the interpretation that the US is actually 
involved in a conflict with its Southern neighbours or, at least, with any per-
son trying to breach the borders of the US. This hint to an aggravation of po-
litical affairs resulting from the danger of a globalized world can be seen as a 
declaration of open conflict with Mexico (or any other Southern state), while 
simultaneously promising the eradication of threat. Heightening the sense of 
danger serves the purpose of keeping the project urgent, so that any political 
opposition can be portrayed as potentially anti-American. 
To summarize, our argument is that the fantasy transported by the metaphor 
and contextualizing narrative is so appealing that it can overcome all kinds 
of logical flaws, inconsistencies and internal contradictions. The immediate 
response that people may have to the symbolic act of erecting a wall to pro-
tect them and keep their wealth and families safe is positive and allows them 
to neglect deeper questions about the validity of the argument – unless for 
reasons such as ideological position or due to prior knowledge they decide to 
fundamentally disbelieve the story anyway. The metaphor of ‘the Wall’ seems 
to help trigger affective responses and invokes fantasies, depending on which 
narratives it is embedded in. 
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5 Conclusion
In view of our initial question – how right-wing populists make anti-globali-
zation appealing – we find that the analysis of metaphors, plots and appeals 
to emotion yields interesting results. We concentrate on the particular salience 
of two guiding metaphors: ‘the House’ and ‘the Wall’. Both metaphors are 
based on the Manichean division of the world into an ‘inside’ and an ‘out-
side’. The ‘inside’ is the nation-state, which is imagined as an entity – a house 
within which people belong to a community and problems are manageable. 
The ‘outside’ is constituted of a chaotic and unknown world inhabited by 
threatening individuals. This neat structure of inside and outside renders both 
metaphors appealing since they reduce the enormous complexity of a glo-
balized world. They also neatly separate spheres of responsibility – of solving 
instead of simply banning these problems – into an inside and outside. The 
externalization of issues to an outside makes it possible to ignore the rea-
sons and solutions for often long-term problems that are hard to counter by 
simply narrating them as excludable and foreign. In both cases, however, the 
perceived crises could be identified as home-grown rather than foreign – and 
yet, the contrary keeps being suggested. Anti-global imagery, therefore, helps 
to externalize problems in order to construct them in an inside/outside logic 
that evokes different affective responses favourable to the political projects of 
these populist leaders.
The metaphors seem to exude an appeal to even an apolitical public because 
they are based on very common objects, which everyone knows from their 
everyday lives. In the case of the house, its ‘sacredness’ is not only linked to 
the basic human need of housing, but also part of a shared cultural repertoire. 
In the right-wing populist narratives, the two metaphors are interwoven into 
a resurrection plot, according to which the inside was once protected from the 
outside, but boundaries have been made porous and threats were allowed to 
enter. The populists competing for votes and support stylize themselves as the 
heroes who will restore the protective barrier towards the threatening outside 
world. This finding is in line with the interpretation given by sociologist Hart-
mut Rosa in view of the far-right movement PEGIDA in Eastern Germany, 
which he sees as the expression of a desperate attempt of a ‘sclerotic society’ 
to ‘keep the world at bay’ (Rosa 2016: 292). According to Rosa, this urge is 
a consequence of a general anxiety caused by hyper-modernity, acceleration 
and globalization, which render living and working conditions precarious. 
This urge to ‘keep the world at bay’ is picked up on by right-wing populist 
politicians – whether or not they themselves have profited from economic and 
political globalization in the past. 
The stories in which the metaphors of houses and walls are embedded are also 
gendered in a specific way. For example, Salvini’s self-ascribed role of making 
Italians the masters of their own nation ‘again’ and at the same time allow the 
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use of fire arms against intruders is mainly aimed at men, who are exhorted to 
become strong protectors of their houses and families. This resonates with the 
claim that Western men have lost their ‘thymos’ or virile energy derived from 
rage, which is widespread among right-wing populists (cf. Heins and Unrau 
2019). The emotions which are involved here include fear and rage, which are 
picked up and turned into emotion norms by the right-wing populists: That 
‘we’ have been rendered unable to ‘defend our house’ is presented as so obvi-
ously outrageous that it is only natural to be angry or indignant. However, the 
negative emotions are counterbalanced by positive ones, which are conjured 
up through the story of how the house will be made safe again and the antici-
pation of safety, harmony and serenity. 
In this paper, we have shown that two powerful metaphors – the House and 
the Wall – are used by right-wing populists to structure the world and tell the 
story of how the separation of inside and outside was restored. By that we do 
not aim at demonizing any use of both metaphors as potentially dangerous or 
as an indicator for populist right-wing world views. Neither do we intend to 
reduce the politics of the populist right to the use of these seemingly harmless 
narratives. Rather, our aim was to illustrate how the use of precisely these 
metaphors from the realm of the everyday with their intuitive appeal and 
multiple associations serves as a vehicle or catalyst for the wider – and more 
openly inhumane – anti-global politics of the populist radical right.     
In this paper, we have mainly concentrated on the policy field of migration, 
which was particularly salient across the performances and utterances of 
right-wing populists with a view to globalization. However, to render the pic-
ture more complete, it would be useful to extend the analysis to other policy 
areas as well, such as trade, climate change or international law. Another 
important question would be to investigate the way political competitors and 
other audiences have reacted to the anti-globalization narratives of right-wing 
populists: Did they adopt some of the images and plots or simply reject them? 
Did they develop counter-narratives and if so, how? These and other ques-
tions still remain to be answered by future research. 
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Abstract
In this paper, we ask how exactly right-wing populists make anti-globalization 
appealing. We follow the growing interest in the ambivalent features of populist 
language and performances by suggesting a conceptual framework around narra-
tives, metaphors, and emotions. We argue that right-wing populists skilfully present 
abstract phenomena of globalization and translate them to individual experiences 
of ‘ordinary people’. Metaphors play a crucial role in populist storytelling, as they 
make sense of a complex reality through imagery. They mobilize collective emotions 
and reach a wider audience through a high degree of linguistic adaptability and 
normative ambiguity. We demonstrate these narrative operations using two recent 
cases of ‘successful’ right-wing populist, anti-globalization storytelling, which build 
on strong metaphors. One is the metaphor of the ‘House’, used by former Italian 
Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Matteo Salvini, and the other is US 
President Donald Trump’s metaphor of ‘The Wall’. We argue that these metaphors 
are used to create an inside/outside distinction that externalizes threats which are 
possibly internal (e.g. drug consumption) to a polity (e.g. external drug abuse or 
organized crime) but can be blamed on globalization through the use of metaphors. 
What is more, metaphors can be utilized to construct a crisis, which in turn makes 
it possible for populists to adopt the saviour-role of an energetic hero who alone is 
able to resolve the supposed crisis.
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tion, Migration
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